What Is the Sochi Agreement

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« Russia will certainly take the necessary precautions to ensure that the Idlib de-escalation zone is not attacked. Together, we will ensure that third-party provocations and breaches of the agreement are detected and prevented. In addition to the Syrian crisis, Ankara and Washington have not been able to reach an agreement on Turkey`s possible purchase of Russian-made defense systems. Exactly one year after the Sochi agreement between Turkey and Russia, which was supposed to bring final peace to Syria, the leaders of both countries met with the Iranian prime minister in Ankara to discuss the lack of progress. Erdogan`s negative reaction to Criticism of Iran has been widely rejected by Tehran`s media, and at this point, the appearance of an undesirable (minor) setback in Iran-Turkey relations can be taken for granted. Some aspects of the Sochi deal attract Iran, but others do not, resulting in predictable mixed admission. Finally, there is a widespread perception in Iran that Erdogan, regardless of verbal commitments to Syrian integrity, is in practice nibbling away at Syrian territory for two consecutive years, with the prospect of major attacks in the next operation. July 6 and 7. In March 2003, Georgian President Eduard Shevdnadze and Russian President Vladimir Putin signed another agreement that would include economic rehabilitation, the resumption of rail networks and the attraction of international investment. That would be a disappointment, especially for Georgians. [5] [6] On October 22, coinciding with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad`s sharp criticism of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a « thief » who « steals our country today, » an « excellent deal » was reached between Erdogan and Russian President Putin that would establish a Turkish-dominated « safe zone » along the Turkish-Syrian border, which would be patrolled jointly by Russian and Turkish forces.

with a seal of approval. The carefully constructed 10-point Sochi agreement calls for the following: The Sochi agreement hopefully refers to the Astana mechanism, but Turkey, especially the Syrian Arab forces now attacking the Kurds, is not expected to respect the Astana mechanism. Nor does the Astana mechanism offer the slightest prospect of leading to the reconstruction assistance that would be crucial to achieving a political solution and stability in Syria. About three million people have entrenched themselves in the Idlib region. Under the 2018 Sochi agreement, Turkey and Russia promised to create a 20-km demilitarized zone, eliminate « radical terrorist groups, » remove heavy equipment including tanks, joint patrols of the Russian and Turkish armies, and a general ceasefire. My educated guess is that sooner or later Russia will regret this deal after seeing the safe zone lined up on a snake pit full of Russian-hating jihadists who are barely controlled by Turkey. Very short-sighted on the part of the Russian leader not to think about what will happen in a few precious months when all these paper commitments of his Turkish friend will have to turn out to be timely lies. Once again, an agreement negotiated by Russia in 1993, the agreement on a ceasefire in Abkhazia and on a mechanism to ensure its observance, allowed a moratorium on the use of force, the withdrawal of the parties to the conflict from the war zone within fifteen days, the creation of a Russian-Georgian-Abkhaz control group to monitor the ceasefire, the return of the Abkhaz parliament to Sukhumi, the placement of United Nations observers in the region and the resumption of talks to settle the dispute.

In August of the same year, UNOMIG was deployed as a United Nations monitoring force. The ceasefire was violated on 27 September when Abkhaz forces captured Sukhumi and declared victory. Pro-Georgian forces then withdrew to Tbilisi when Georgia joined the CIS and changed Russia`s attitude towards Georgia on the issue. Turkey, which is trying to comply with the Sochi agreement with Russia on Idlib, Syria, is calling on all parties to the conflict to keep their word and work for stability, Turkey`s communications director said on Twitter on Saturday. Referring to the Sochi agreement between Turkey and Russia, he called on all parties to keep their word. « We reached an agreement with Russia in Sochi and we are trying to maintain it. We will not be afraid to protect our own armed forces from any threat. No one should test our resolve, » he said.

Putin stressed the importance of preserving Syria`s territorial integrity and removing what he considered illegitimate foreign forces from Syrian territory, and then worked on the phone to get Assad`s buy-in. However, Assad reiterated his firm opposition to the Turkish military presence in Syria, his determination to use « all legitimate means » to counter Turkey`s « invasion » and ensure the return of the masses of war refugees, who number about 250,000 since the beginning of Turkey`s Operation Peace Spring with the help of Arab proxies. who have since been accused of numerous atrocities against the Kurds. If Kurdish fighters protecting the local population leave, as provided for in the Sochi agreement, there is a clear possibility of further displacement and atrocities against the civilian population, similar to Operation Efrin in 2018, which was denounced by human rights organizations as having resulted in ethnic cleansing. But perhaps the most important issue concerns the battle-hardened Kurds, who, after nearly two weeks of fierce fighting, have yet to be uprooted from the besieged border towns by Erdogan`s army and mercenaries. Erdgoan has his eyes on the crucial area of Manbij, where, according to the agreement between the Kurds and Damascus, there has been a new infusion of Syrian forces that are strengthening the city`s defenses. As a result, the « safe zone » is likely to be disputed territory for some time, which could damage Russia`s relations with the Kurds, the Syrian government and Iran if Putin`s fighter jets and helicopters began to punish the Syrian Kurds as an irrecoverable cost of their new « win-win » partnership with Ankara. The Sochi Agreement (also known as the Dagomys Agreement (Russian: Дагомысские соглашения), official Russian name: « Cоглашение о принципах мирного урегуло рования грузино-осетинского конфликта ») was a ceasefire agreement that reportedly marked the end of the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhaz conflicts signed in Sochi on 24 June 1992, the ceasefire with Abkhazia on 27 July, 1993. As for Tehran`s reaction, it is unlikely that an enthusiastic adoption of the Sochi Agreement is imminent. Tehran prefers to stay in tune with Damascus, which explains the Iranian leadership`s repeated calls for Turkey to immediately cease its military action. Indeed, an editorial in the conservative daily Kayhan, close to the Supreme Leader, criticises the Sochi agreement as « controversial », surprising Russia`s allies in Tehran and Damascus, and paving the way for a « new crisis », while responding to Turkey`s dubious quest for a « safe zone ». In 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Georgian President Shevardnadze and Abkhaz Prime Minister Gennady Gagulia and launched a Sochi process to establish a Georgian-Russian-Abkhaz Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures (CBM).

The parties have tried to facilitate the return of refugees and economic reconstruction. The Sochi process was a step backwards from a multilateral to a bilateral format that Georgia set up itself to confront Russia and the Abkhazians. It was also seen as undermining Georgia`s argument that the Geneva process is the only format for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. [7] In 2004, it was found that Russia was in violation of the agreement when a Russian company began maintenance work on the Sochi-Sukhumi railway, which was legally Georgian, although it is controlled by Russia and the Abkhazians. This decision was considered a violation, although the restoration could only take place in parallel with the safe return of Georgian refugees from the Gali district of Abkhazia. However, there has been no progress on the return of refugees, and therefore Russia`s unilateral actions on the railway violated the Sochi agreement. [8] [7] However, there has been no progress on the return of refugees. [Citation needed] « With this agreement, we have ruled out a major humanitarian crisis in Idlib, » Erdogan told reporters at the press conference with Putin. Russia negotiated a ceasefire and negotiated the agreement in 1992.

The agreement primarily established a ceasefire between the Georgian and South Ossetian armed forces, but also defined a conflict zone around south Ossetia`s capital, Tskhinvali, and established a security corridor along the border of the as yet unrecognized territories of South Ossetia. The agreement also established a Joint Monitoring Commission and a peacekeeping organization, the Joint Peacekeeping Force (JPKF). The JPKF was placed under Russian command and consisted of peacekeepers from Georgia, Russia and North Ossetia (the separatist government of South Ossetia had not yet been recognized; However, South Ossetian Peacekeepers served in the North Ossetia contingent). In addition, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has agreed to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate negotiations. [1] [2] The OSCE has sought to eliminate sources of tension, support the existing ceasefire and create a broader political framework to mitigate long-term discord. [3] [4] A big question, of course, is how long Turkey will remain on Syrian territory, given Erdogan`s stated intention to resettle about 1.5 million refugees from his current camps in Turkey. The « safe zone » can also turn into a « safe haven » for anti-Assad forces, who are currently acting as Erdogan`s aides in Operation Spring Peace, advancing their own agenda, which conflicts with some of Erdogan`s obligations under the Sochi agreement. .